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DEALER RECOVERY FOR UNREASONABLE REFUSALS
TO DEAL UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
The oligopolist or "big-firm" requires special treatment within
the contours of the Sherman Act.' Although government prosecutions
enjoy the legal spotlight at present,2 the private treble damage action
should not be overlooked as an effective deterrent to abuses of market
power. The time is ripe for refining theories of recovery and develop-
ing novel and effective remedies for the injured party in light of the
"new attitude" toward antitrust law.
In the Colgate decision3 of 1919 the Supreme Court recognized the
unqualified right of a business entity to deal or not deal with whomever
it chooses. But absolute antitrust immunity for refusals to deal is diffi-
cult to accept in the context of the modern oligopoly or multi-firm
industry with several dominant producers. 4 Since the producer enjoys
a disproportionate percentage of the total market power, its refusal to
deal may end a distributor's business. The distributor is in an inher-
ently disadvantageous position; he must either meet the demands of
the big-firm producer--demands that may range from resale price
maintenance to territorial division-or forfeit a substantial percentage
of his business. The courts have developed several techniques for
reaching the offending firm without expressly overruling the Colgate
decision. Although the emphasis has been on government prosecutions
under the "per se" rules of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, effective
protection for the dealer can and should be provided by devising potent
private remedies for refusals to deal.5
1 Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. RyV. 285 (1966). Precise definition of "big-firm" is
difficult, but workable guidelines are provided by the "market power" test of Kaysen and
Turner in their proposed Sherman Act amendment:
Market power shall be conclusively presumed where, for five years or more, one
company has accounted for 50 percent or more of annual sales in the market,
or four or fewer companies have accounted for 80 percent of such sales.
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLIcy 98 (1959).
2 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
3 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
4 An oligopoly is a market situation in which each one of a small number of producers
has sufficient market power to influence the market but not enough to disregard com-
petitors. The auto industry is an example.
An industry with hundreds of producers may have several producers in control
of 20% to 40% of the market. The liquor industry is an example of the multi-firm
siuation with several dominant producers-a quasi-oligopoly. Both market situations are
characterized by the presence of big-firms.
5 The old remedies have proved ineffective. "Indeed, treble damage suits brought
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The intra-enterprise conspiracy theory may provide the key to a
workable solution. Examination of this theory in light of recent big-
firm refusal-to-deal cases reveals that, although present intra-enterprise
conspiracy theories may be effective as a stop-gap measure, the problem
can properly be solved only with judicial recognition that big-firm re-
fusals to deal require exceptional treatment. A new but related theory
within the broad language of section 1 is necessary.
I
DEALER RECOVERY AND INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY-
THE EVOLUTION TO Kiefer-Stewart
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, condemning every "contract, com-
bination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade," seems to require at
least two participants to establish a violation. Nonetheless, "conspiracy"
has been interpreted, under certain circumstances, to include conduct
by a single economic entity. Thus, the General Motors empire, with its
numerous corporate groupings, can form a conspiracy when one part
of the corporate family acts in concert with another.7 The conceptual
problems implicit in this result are amplified by the conflict between
the "entity" theory of corporations and the practical fact that most
corporations operate through the combined agency of numerous real
persons.
In Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,8 the plaintiff
argued that a single corporation should be held liable under section 1
on the theory that its officers had conspired among themselves or with
the corporation. Although an early case had held that such activity could
constitute a conspiracy for Sherman Act purposes, 9 the Fifth Circuit
denied recovery, treating the single corporate form as a per se defense.
The court noted:
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons
or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with
by cut-off dealers have uniformly failed." Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 860 (1955) (footnote omitted), and cases cited
therein.
6 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
7 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 618 (1941).
8 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). Nelson, a wholesale
distributor of appliances, sought treble damages for Motorola's refusal to supply him
with communications equipment, to which he was allegedly entitled under the distributor
agreement.
9 Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939).
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itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the general
rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation. 10
Subsequent cases11 and the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee To Study the Antitrust Laws12 have accepted the Motorola rule,
but numerous writers have argued that the officer-conspiracy route is
essential to effective regulation of the big-firm.'3 It seems safe for the
present, however, to conclude that the specter of per se illegality14 ap-
plied to business decisions of all but one-man firms effectively discour-
ages the courts from parting with the Motorola holding.
Although Motorola frustrated any attempt to find a conspiracy
among the officers of a single firm, two prosecutions against multi-cor-
porate entities followed a different avenue, establishing in the 1940's
what has become the traditional intra-enterprise conspiracy theory. In
United States v. General Motors Corp.,15 the court found that appel-
lants could not "enjoy the benefits of separate corporate identity and
escape the consequences of an illegal combination in restraint of trade
by insisting that they are in effect a single trader."' 6 Thus, if the eco-
10 200 F.2d at 914.
11 A corporation has the right as a single manufacturer to select its customers
and to refuse to sell its goods to any one, for any reason, and does not violate
§ 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting c6nspiracy when it exercises that right
through its own officers and agents.
Herren Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 153 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D. Ga. 1957); see Johnny
Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960).
'12 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrEE To STuDY THE ANTI-
TRUsT LAws (1955) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT]. A good examination of the
report's findings is Carlston, Basic Antitrust Concepts, 53 MicH. L. REV. 1033 (1955).
13 Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23
MONTANA L. REV. 158 (1962); Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman
Act, 63 YALE LJ. 372 (1954). But see, e.g., Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 9 ABA
ANTITRUSr SEcrIoN 20, 31 (1956): "[T]he theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy is ill con-
ceived, legally and economically unjustifiable and, in terms of antitrust policy and
practices, untenable and unworkable."
14 Since they constitute significant impairment on free and unfettered competition,
agreements among competitors to fix prices, share markets, collectively boycott, pool
profits, or restrict production are illegal per se. Examples of vertical restraints subject to
per se illegality are price fixing, territorial division, and customer restrictions. United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 265 (1967). See Note, Restrictive Distribution Arrange-
ments After the Schwinn Case, 53 CoRxm.L L. REv. 514 (1968). For the advantages of
proceeding under the per se rule of § 1 instead of the monopoly provisions of § 2, see
McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41
VA. L. Rv. 183, 184-88 (1955).
'15 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). General Motors Corpora-
tion, General Motors Sales Corporation, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, and
General Motors Acceptance Corporation of Indiana were convicted of conspiring in
violation of § 1 to force GM dealers to use GM financing programs for both factory and
consumer sales. For a good discussion of the possible interpretations of the General Motors
case, see McQuade, supra note 14, at 189-92.
16 121 F.2d at 404.
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nomic entity chooses to do business as a multi-corporate organization,17
it provides courts with a handle for the section 1 frying pan. Although
repeatedly contending that applying section 1 in the General Motors
situation is necessary to prevent form from governing substance, the
courts actually rely on the form of multi-corporateness to reach the
substance of restraint of trade.
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,' s where the parent manufac-
turing company required operating companies to buy cabs exclusively
from the parent, the Supreme Court formulated the test of Sherman
Act illegality as the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint
of trade. Affiliation or integration under common ownership was held
not to vitiate liability where a conspiracy could be found if the com-
panies were independent. The Court's conclusion that the "corporate
interrelationships of the conspirators . . . are not determinative of the
applicability of the Sherman Act"'9 was viewed by some as indicative of
a judicial predilection for expansion of intra-enterprise conspiracy in
both the inter-officer and parent-subsidiary areas. 20 Later cases bear out
the accuracy of the prediction in regard to the parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship.21
The 1955 Committee Report accepted the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy theory, but restricted its application to parent-subsidiary con-
spiracies to restrain the trade of strangers to the corporate family.2 2 A
minority of the sixty-one committeemen believed that a finding of
conspiracy should not depend on the form of the organization and,
therefore, that liability is inappropriate when a single economic entity
is involved, regardless of its nominal divisibility. The majority dis-
agreed, but recommended that the theory not be applied to enforce
'17 The possible advantages of multi-corporate form include:
[S]eparating sales from manufacturing and increasing efficiency; limiting the
liabilities to each enterprise; dividing income at lower tax rates between the
several enterprises; effectuating estate planning; creating entities which will permit
eventual sale at capital gain; increasing the combined borrowing capacity of the
resulting companies; creating a separate entity to handle a competitive line;
incorporating a separate entity in a different locality to avoid prejudice against
absentee ownership; transferring certain of the activities to another state whose
laws favor a domestic corporation.
H. HENN, CORORATIONS § 17, at 34 (1961).
18 382 U.s. 218 (1947),
19 Id. at 227.
20 Note, Are Two or More Persons Necessary To Have a Conspiracy Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act?, 48 ILL. L. REv. 551 (1948). For the view that the proper analysis of
the Yellow Cab case is that the defendants were guilty of forming a combination to restrain
trade rather than for conspiring to restrain trade, see McQuade, supra note 14, at 192-95.
21 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 840 U.S. 211 (1951).
22 CoMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 12, at 80-86.
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competition within the firm.23 Use of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
theory, however, at least when external restraints by competing parts of
a single economic entity are the judicial target, necessarily entails the
regulation of competition within the firm. Thus, the Committee's
adoption of the concept formulated in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons24 seems odd.
Kiefer-Stewart is the leading intra-enterprise conspiracy case al-
lowing dealer recovery after a refusal to deal. The plaintiff, an Indiana
wholesale liquor distributor, stocked both Seagram and Calvert brand
whiskies. Seagram and Calvert were incorporated subsidiaries of Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., but held themselves out to the public as com-
petitors. When the plaintiff charged higher prices on resale than those
fixed by Seagram, Seagram refused to sell. Calvert later joined the re-
fusal on the grounds that it "had 'to go along with Seagram.' ",25 The
Court upheld treble damage recovery of almost one million dollars,
reasoning that "common ownership and control does not liberate cor-
porations from the impact of the antitrust laws .... The rule is espe-
cially applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as
competitors." 26
Stressing the illegality of an agreement between two parties not
to deal with a third, the Court recognized that "Seagram and Calvert
acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal."27 But since it
declined to treat Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., as a single economic
entity, the Court denied Seagram's single-trader defense. This tech-
nique of regarding the subsidiaries as separable economic and legal
entities was adopted by the Committee Report as the ultimate exten-
sion of intra-enterprise conspiracy.28 The Committee attempted to
23 "To demand internal competition within and between the members of a single
business unit is to invite chaos without promotion of the public welfare." Id. at 34.
24 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
25 Id. at 213.
26 Id. at 215.
27 Id. at 214.
28 CommrrrEE REoRT, supra note 12, at 35. There has been strong objection to the
case from other quarters:
Finding a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because of a conspiracy solely
between a parent and its subsidiaries, or between subsidiaries, is like condemning
the bi-sexual oyster for incest. Neither the oyster nor a corporate family should
be condemned for something it cannot avoid.
Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5,
27 (1963).
Even writers favoring the use of intra-enterprise conspiracy to reach big-firm mis-
conduct have had trouble reconciling the Kiefer-Stewart holding with other intra-
enterprise conspiracy cases. For example, the Motorola and Kiefer-Stewart rationales are
seen as inconsistent, since artificial persons within a single enterprise (Seagram) can
[Vol. 53:720
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draw a clear line by conceding that "there would.., be no liability
under Section 1, if a company does business through unincorporated
branches, divisions or departments...."29
Recent cases demonstrate that the intra-enterprise conspiracy
theory is likely to undergo further refinement and that ultimately it
may be necessary to remold present conspiracy concepts to provide an
effective private remedy for unreasonable refusals to deal.
II
A NEW WRINKLE IN INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY-
TH. Hawaiian Oke CASE
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., was a large wholesale liquor dis-
tributor in competition with, among others, McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
until mid-1965. At that time, the suppliers of brands constituting more
than fifty percent of Hawaiian Oke's sales exercised contract termin-
ation rights. Immediately thereafter, McKesson, which had recently
formed a second wholesaling division, was given what had been Hawai-
ian Oke's business. The suppliers involved were Barton Distilling
Company and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Barton Western Distilling
Company, and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, House of Seagram, Inc. House of Seagram had seven unin-
corporated sales divisions, three of which-Calvert, Four Roses, and
Frankfort- dealt with Hawaiian Oke. After termination of the con-
tract, Hawaiian Oke liquidated, ascertained its damages to be $290,000
and brought a treble damage action against Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
House of Seagram, McKesson, Barton Distilling, and Barton Western
Distilling."0 Hawaiian Oke contended that McKesson, the Barton com-
conspire for § I purposes, while real persons within a single corporation (Motorola) cannot.
Comment, supra note 13, at 386-87. Compared with the Yellow Cab or General Motors
cases, however, Kiefer-Stewart seems more appropriate for the imposition of § 1 liability,
since its overtones of monopoly are weaker and competition among subsidiaries supplies a
more reasonable basis for finding plurality. Perhaps the best explanation for the difficulty
some commentators have had with the Kiefer-Stewart problem is the very presence of the
monopoly taint in the earlier cases. General Motors and Yellow Cab can be "rationalized
away" to some extent on the grounds that liability quite probably could have been
imposed by application of other sanctions within the antitrust laws. Kiefer-Stewart, how-
ever, is less easily dismissed. The Court used the intra-enterprise conspiracy theory not
so much as an easy way out, but rather as a full-fledged remedy of potentially wide applica-
tion.
29 CommrrrEE REPoRT, supra note 12, at 35.
30 Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915
(D. Hawaii 1967). The action was brought under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which
provides:
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panies, and the Seagram companies, together with the three unincor-
porated divisions of House of Seagram had combined or conspired to
restrain its trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.31 The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding a conspiracy among
all named defendants. 82
The most important aspect of the case is a jury instruction pro-
posed by plaintiff, directing that each of the unincorporated divisions
of House of Seagram be treated as separate corporations for purposes
of determining whether there had been a violation of the antitrust
laws.33 Though prior cases seemed to favor the defendant,34 the court
recognized that the "factual conclusion that a division has independence
of action in the relevant business activity is critical to a determination
that the division is legally capable of conspiring." 35 Alert plaintiff's
counsel supplied the court with a wealth of testimony permitting such
a conclusion. For example, when plaintiff's counsel asked the president
of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons to elaborate on divisional reporting prac-
tices, the witness replied:
Well, we run a pretty autonomous operation, and the heads of the
companies pretty well run their own shows. They keep me in-
formed or posted on what is taking place, but they don't report to
me for direction. We sort of have what you call a General Motors
type concept here.36
Other testimony established that the divisions were in actual competi-
tion with each other, that they normally made independent manage-
ment decisions regarding choice of distributors, and that each division
set its own pricing and advertising policy.37 The court, therefore, had
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). The antitrust laws referred to in the statute
include §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and §§ 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act.
31 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
82 272 F. Supp. at 924 n.26.
33 Id. at 917. For the purposes of returning a verdict, the divisions were to be treated
as House of Seagram.
84 Counsel argued that Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348,
353-54 (D. Del. 1962), Kemwel Automotive Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 1966 Trade Cas.
71,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and other cases supported defendant's positon that unin-
corporated divisions of a corporation cannot conspire. See Memorandum for Defendant
at 11 n.2, Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, inc., 272 F. Supp. 91
(D. Hawaii 1967).
35 272 F. Supp. at 919.
386 Id. at 921.
87 Id. at 921-25.
[Vol. 53:720
11EF US4LS TO DEAL
no difficulty finding, "on the peculiar facts demonstrated," independent
divisional operation in the pertinent business activity (sales), resulting
in separate business entities under the antitrust laws. Various inter-
pretations of Hawaiian Oke are possible. Should a similar divisional
conspiracy case arise, defendant's counsel might distinguish Hawaiian
Oke on grounds that the court may simply have found de facto corpo-
rations within House of Seagram, each independently subject to and-
trust liability, or that it may have allowed recovery merely to prevent
Seagram from escaping liability under Kiefer-Stewart by a mere change
in formal organization.38 Neither interpretation is likely, however, in
view of the substantial similarity between subsidiaries and "indepen-
dent" divisions. When divisional independence is not pronounced, the
testimony in Hawaiian Oke makes it easily distinguishable.
Although Hawaiian Oke represents a new development in the
theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy, its application may be limited to
competing and possibly noncompeting divisions responsible for a re-
straint of trade. Big-firms not organized along these lines may remain
immune from treble damage suits for unreasonable refusals to deal.
Thus, significant restraints on trade, stemming from attempted imposi-
tions of vertical restraints, 9 may go unchecked unless a specific remedy
can be developed for big-firm abuses.
III
REACHING "Bic-Finu" UNREASONABLE REFUSALS TO DEAL-
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONSPIRACY THEORY
If the Hawaiian Oke theory gains acceptance, the typical big-firm
will expose itself to section 1 liability only when it chooses to do
business in either multicorporate or divisional form. Should immunity
from liability exist when a big-firm is not so organized? Should divi-
sional organization be any more telling than corporateness? Ideally, the
conduct of the defendant should be the sole test of liability. But a
defendant must be brought within the language of section I if the
38 It will be interesting to see what form the Seagram organization assumes as a
result of the Hawaiian Oke decision.
39 For judicial awareness of the difficulty in attacking vertical restraints by § 1 treble
damage actions, see, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 565, 391 n.12
(1967) (Stewart, J. concurring):
One difference between a horizontal conspiracy and vertical restraints imposed
by the manufacturer is that there is often serious question whether the latter
conduct involves the "contract, combination... or conspiracy" required by § 1
of the Sherman Act ......
1968]
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plaintiff is to avoid the more difficult evidentiary burdens of other
antitrust remedies, such as proving an attempt to monopolize under
section 2. One avenue might be to treat the big-firm as a unique develop-
ment requiring an entirely new judicial approach. The broad language
of section 1 provides ample leeway for the development of new theories
and allows an economically responsive court to achieve the desired
results without blatant judicial amendment of the antitrust laws.
One writer contends that the judiciary must respond to today's
economic structure by developing a judicial policy of "social control"
aimed at enforcing "workable competition" within the big-firm, and
that the intra-enterprise conspiracy theory provides the perfect vehicle
for the evolution of this policy.40 Though the theory is exceedingly
broad in scope,41 it does suggest a unique and feasible method for
reaching unreasonable refusals to deal by a big-firm.
A small or medium-size distributor 42 dealing with a big-firm
43
operates under an inherent disadvantage. The dominant firm occupies
a privileged position as the life-blood of the distributor's business and
can dictate pricing regulations, territorial restrictions, special prefer-
ences, and other business policies.44 Although these demands can
easily be refused prior to accepting a dealership, once the relationship
has been established and a dealer has adapted his marketing technique,
his financing arrangements, and possibly his physical plant to a specific
product line, his ability to "take his business elsewhere" is substantially
reduced. Thus, the distributor's freedom in the market is gradually
eroded until he faces the choice of living uncomfortably with the big-
firm or not living at all. The privileged big-firm should, therefore, be
held in check, and some method of satisfying the plurality requirement
of conspiracy should be developed.
The rationale for reaching this single-firm abuse of power lies in
the organizational structure of the big-firm.45 The large businesses in our
40 Solo, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy and the Theory of the Firm, 34 J. Bus. (U. Chi.)
153 (1961).
41 [I]n my view, the regulation of the internal relationships of the economic
entity is required around the whole circle, and, indeed, the extension and develop-
ment of such regulations represents a next necessary phase in the development of
the law.
Id. at 166.
42 A small distributor might be characterized as serving less than 5% of the market
and a medium-size distributor as serving up to 20%. If the distributor controls a larger
percentage of the market, his bargaining power eliminates the need for special treatment.
43 See note 1 supra for an explanation of "big-firm".
44 Although such restrictions, once accepted by the dealer, can be attacked by the
enforcement agencies as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, this is small consolation to the
dealer who has rejected such demands and had his distributorship cancelled.
45 See Solo, supra note 40, at 156-59.
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economy can hardly be equated with the entrepreneurial midgets of
former eras. Transcontinental enterprises have grown by merger, ac-
quisition, and consolidation to positions of power in a wide variety of
manufacturing and service industries. These complex economic giants
bear little resemblance to the entities created by the industrialists of
the 1890's. For the big-firm, operating from a single locality is seldom
feasible. Centralized decision-making and fusion of ownership and
control are impractical. Alfred P. Sloane, Jr., summarizing his analysis
of the General Motors complex remarked that "[a]n organization does
not make the decisions; its function is to provide a framework, based
upon established criteria, within which decisions can be fashioned in
an orderly manner. '46 Typically, the decisions "fashioned" within this
framework are achieved not through the decision-making function of a
single individual or department, but rather through the interaction of
severable parts of the organization. Whether these parts are character-
ized as subsidiaries, divisions, or branches is unimportant to the
determination of their indispensability. As an organization grows,
decision-making bodies evolve within the firm, each primarily con-
cerned with its particular sphere of activity in the business framework.
Diverse and often competing divisions of the firm function sometimes
autonomously and sometimes in concert, depending on the activity
involved. These related but severable pockets of power may be de-
lineated by product or geographical area, or may crystalize along the
familiar lines of manufacturing, research and development, finance,
public relations, and sales. Whatever form the big-firm adopts, de-
centralization by function and evolution of pockets of power are
inevitable concomitants of its growth.
This multiplicity of decision-making bodies should be viewed as /
supplying sufficient plurality for section 1 purposes. Thus, when a
plaintiff demonstrates a refusal to deal by a big-firm-a firm with fifty
percent or more of annual sales in the market, or one of four or fewer
companies accounting for eighty percent of sales47  his cause of action
46 A. SLOAN, My YEARs wrr- GENERAL MOTOpR 443 (1964).
47 The courts have used similar sales-percentage formulas as tests for the existence
of a monopoly. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 423-34 (2d
Cir. 1945). In non-monopoly cases such percentages are frequently resorted to as an aid in
reaching a decision. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn S. Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368-69
(1967).
In the United States, antitrust legislation does not operate against a dominant per
se; thus, "mere size is no offense." This particular ruling has been qualified,
however, by the dictum that " . . size carries with it an opportunity for abuse
that is not to be ignored ......
Roberts, The Concept of the Dominant Firm, 13 CARTE. 142, 144 (1963).
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
should be within the "conspiracy" provision of section 1. His chances of
recovery will then turn on the treatment accorded the refusal to deal.
A plaintiff should have the advantage of per se rules" if the
refusal to deal stems from an attempted imposition of vertical restraints
that are illegal per se-price-fixing, territorial division, and post-sale
customer restrictions.49 If the refusal to deal is not within the per 4e
class,10 or is best characterized as arbitrary, the rule of reason should
be applied.51 A defendant can escape liability by demonstrating a
"good business reason" for his refusal to deal. Under this approach,
arbitrary refusals to deal, never before reached under the antitrust laws,
will be illegal-an appropriate result in light of the big-firm's privi-
leged position. On the other hand, a refusal stemming from noncom-
pliance with restrictions not per se illegal (i.e., exclusive dealing ar-
rangements) will be allowed if the defendant demonstrates a valid
justification. The effect on commerce of the defendant's action becomes
the primary consideration, while a major criticism of the intra-enterprise
conspiracy theory-the absence of any attempt to ascertain the offend-
ing party's economic strength 5 2-is eliminated. Founded on the recog-
nition that "there is nothing in Section 1 of the Sherman Act which
exempts 'single traders' in the economic sense of that term from the
prohibitions against restraining trade,"5 3 the organizational conspiracy
48 See note 14 supra for an explanation of per se illegality.
49 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
50 An example of a vertical restraint not yet per se illegal is an exclusive dealing
arrangement.
51 Although the Sherman Act condemns all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, the Supreme Court limited the statutory prohibitions to unreasonable
restraints of trade. The judicial formulation of this rule of reason is in the 1911 Standard
Oil opinion:
The merely generic enumeration which the statute makes of the acts to which it
refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as used in the statute
leaves room for but one conclusion, which is, that it was expressly designed not
to unduly limit the application of the act by precise definition, but while dearly
fixing a standard, that is, by defining the ulterior boundaries which could not be
transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be determined by the light of reason,
guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public
policy embodied in the statute, in every given case whether any particular act or
contract was within the contemplation of the statute.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911). "Rule of reason" is actually a
misnomer, since the concept is an approach or technique, not a rule in the strict sense of
that term.
52 "A boycott by ; powerful corporation, under the ratio decidendi of the courts,
would presumably be upheld while the combined boycott of several pigmies would be
denounced." Handier, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REV. 175, 207 (1936) (footnote
omitted).
53 Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its Officers
Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1
of the Sherman Act?, 11 FED. B.J. 130, 141 (1951).
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theory provides an economically valid and legally sensible handle for
the regulation of market power excesses manifested in unreasonable
refusals to deal.
IV
PRESENT INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CONSPIRACY THEORIES COMPARED-Amplex of Maryland
The facts of Hawaiian Oke invited application of the traditional
intra-enterprise conspiracy theory. But when the defendant is not
organized by divisions or the divisions are not competing, or when the
injured distributor dealt with only one division of a multi-division
firm, this approach is not likely to be followed. The organizational
conspiracy theory, however, allows the imposition of liability in all
the above situations provided defendant is a big-firm.
Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp.4 illustrates
the usefulness of the organizational conspiracy theory when intra-
enterprise conspiracy concepts are inapposite. Amplex was a marine
store with an established retail business on Chesapeake Bay. Outboard
is the nation's largest manufacturer of outboard motors. Its most
successful products are manufactured by separate divisions-Johnson
Motors Division and Evinrude Motors Division. Johnson Motor's policy,
established in 1957, was that no dealer in its product should be refused,
nor any dealership cancelled, solely because the dealer desired to market
a competing line of engines.r5 This policy was in force in 1960 when
Outboard granted Amplex a dealership, although Amplex, at that
time was also retailing Scott-Atwater engines. The initial dealership
agreement was later extended until September 30, 1961. Inl June 1961,
Amplex began selling Mercury outboard motors. This action was
protested by Outboard's district sales representative in charge of dealer
accounts, orders, and franchises. The representative advised Amplex
that unless dealings with Mercury were terminated, Outboard would
54 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967).
65 Id. at 113-14. Such a policy is by no means required by the antitrust laws, Ace
Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 287 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 922
(1963), Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Gir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944
(1961), and Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, 218 F,2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954) establish
that:
[A] manufacturer must be free, in so far as the antitrust laws are concerned, to
replace an existing distributor with a new one regardless of the hardship for the
former and even in the absence of any plausible justification.
Fulda, Individual Refusals To Deal: When Does Single-Firtn Conduct Becomte Vertical
Restraint? 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 590, 597 (1965) (footnote omitted).
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not renew the dealership. When Amplex failed to drop Mercury, Out-
board refused to deal. Amplex sued Outboard for violation of Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. By agreement of the parties, the trial court,
sitting without a jury, separately tried the issue of liability under the
antitrust laws, and dismissed for failure of proof. Its judgment was
sustained on appeal.5 6 Although no intra-enterprise conspiracy argu-
ment was advanced, the case provides a useful vehicle for analysis.
Amplex was not suited to application of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy theory. In contrast to Hawaiian Oke &c Liquors, Amplex was not
dealing with several divisions of a single firm; and although Outboard
was organized with ostensibly competing divisions, the decision to drop
Amplex came not from agreement by the division heads but directly
from Outboard through its district representative. Without plurality
at the divisional level, and without independence of action by the
division, plaintiff would be forced to establish plurality-separate legal
entities-by arguing that Johnson Motors Division and Outboard
Marine Corporation were the conspiring units. Obviously, these entities
do not compete, but this need not be determinative. The General
Motors court specifically dealt with the noncompetition problem,
4 finding that a "combination of noncompetitors may conspire to restrain
unreasonably the interstate trade and commerce of third parties and
thereby subject themselves to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act."57
Though this dictum might aid Amplex, there is another more difficult
hurdle. The liaison activities of the district representative contrast
sharply with the independence of the Seagram entities. Absent clearly
defined entities, the plurality requirement of intra-enterprise conspiracy
cannot be satisfied, and recovery will probably be denied.
A different result might be reached under the organizational con-
56 380 F.2d at 114-15. The appellate court raised the question of liability under § 3
of the Claytdn Act but held it inapplicable to unilateral refusals to deal. Section 3 provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for
use, consumption or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular posession or other place under the juris-
diction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or
rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the
lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
58 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
57 United States v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
618 (1941).
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spiracy theory. The threshold requirement of big-firm organization can
be demonstrated by a cursory presentation of Outboard's nationwide
production and sales practices, accounting for over sixty percent of the
outboard motor market in the United States.5 8 Amplex could then
present evidence of compliance with business" standards emphasizing
Outboard's ostensible policy of nonexclusive dealing. If sufficient evi-
dence is presented, recovery will turn on Outboard's demonstration of
"good business reasons" for refusing to deal. In light of Outboard's
apparent about-face on exclusive dealing, such a demonstration is
unlikely. Thus, in situations where the substantial limitations on intra-
enterprise conspiracy render that theory inapplicable, organizational
conspiracy may permit recovery.
V
ALTERNATIVES TO ORGANIZATIONAL CONSPIRAY-
NAKED RESTRAINT OR LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT
Although the organizational conspiracy theory is a novel approach
to antitrust law, it is less revolutionary than a related theory that
despairs entirely of meeting the conspiracy requirement. The pro-
ponents of judicial disregard of the term "conspiracy" argue that the
courts, as administrators of the antitrust laws, should make the presence
or absence of an unreasonable restraint the only criterion of violation.
The incidence and effect of the antitrust laws would thus be the same
regardless of the form of organization. 9 Detractors of the theory admit
that it might be "attractive except for the fact that the sudden complete
departure of the duality quality of conspiracy would expose a naked
restraint of trade doctrine incapable of facing the legal world." 60 How
"naked" such a doctrine would be is questionable. If the courts apply
58 380 F.2d at 114.
59 Judge Rives's dissenting opinion in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,
200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953), presents what is perhaps the
most appealing argument for such a theory:
[P]laintiff cannot recover because the scheme was concocted under the cloak of
immunity of a single corporate entity. At long last a method has been found to
flout the purposes of the antitrust laws and to deny the victims any recourse to the
courts.
Id. at 916.
60 Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. RaV. 743, 766 (1950). Rahl's
solution to the problem of unreasonable exercise of market power, short of monopoly, is
to approach such action "as an attempt to monopolize, with minor infractions left to the
Federal Trade Commission's law of unfair competition." Id. at 767. Unfortunately, neither
alternative is of much help to the private plaintiff attempting to avoid the time and ex-
pense of a § 2 action.
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the rule-of-reason concept when actual conspiracy is absent and reserve
per se illegality for situations in which conspiracy is present, antitrust
actions will be facilitated without denominating as per se illegal every
decision that injures another's business.
The broad language of Yellow-Cab--"[t]he test of illegality under
the act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on
interstate commerce" 61-or General Motors "[t]he test .. . is not so
much the particular form of business organization effected, as it is the
presence or absence of restraint of trade and commerce" 62-suggest a
judicial preference for the naked-restraint theory grounded in the
belief that nature of conduct rather than organizational form should
govern. The naked-restraint theory also eliminates the need for the
numerous fictions that haunt intra-enterprise conspiracy. The Sherman
Act, however, does not condemn restraints of trade as such, but merely
prohibits every "contract, combination, or conspiracy" to restrain trade.
Thus, any proposal for complete disregard of the plurality concept
requires an unreasonable construction of the Sherman Act or blatant
judicial legislation.
The improbability that a court will impose liability in open dis-
regard of the language of the statute makes naked restraint less attractive
than organizational conspiracy. Under the latter theory, a court can
limit liability to cases in which undue market power is present. No
similar bounds can be applied under the naked-restraint theory, which
would impose liability without regard to the size and market power
of the defendant, thus ignoring the basic justification for expanded
liability-preventing the big-firm's abuse of its privileged market posi-
tion.
The word-bending and fictionalizing characteristics of both the
intra-enterprise conspiracy and the naked-restraint theories have led
several observers to conclude that the only reasonable solution is
amendment of the Sherman Act.6 Professors Kaysen and Turner have
proposed amendments allowing direct attacks on firms having excessive
market power regardless of "conspiracy." 64 For purposes of the amend-
ments:
Market power shall be conclusively presumed where, for five years
61 332 U.S. at 227.
62 121 F.2d at 404.
63 See, e.g., C. KAYsEN & D. TuRNER, supra note 1; Note, Chain Stores Under the
Sherman Act, 47 CoLum. L. Rav. 786, 799 (1947).
64 C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at ch. 4-5. The express goals of the policy
are (1) limitation of market power, (2) achievement of desirable economic performance,
(3) "fair" business conduct, and (4) redistribution of social power between large and small
business. Id. at 45.
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or more, one company has accounted for 50 percent or more of
annual sales in the market, or four or fewer companies have
accounted for 80 percent of such sales.6 5
Section 2 would be repealed and a variety of forbidden activities
requiring specific intent and carrying criminal penalties would be
substituted. 66
Section I would be amended only to the extent of removing crim-
inal penalties. The crux of the proposal is more revolutionary. The
basic provisions would establish an Economic Court to determine, in an
equity proceeding instituted by an Industrial Reorganization Com-
mission, whether the big-firm's market power unreasonably injures
trade and commerce. If unreasonable market power is found, the court
would be authorized to order divestiture or division of defendant's
assets. Unreasonable market power is not deemed a violation of the
antitrust laws for purposes of private suits.0 7 Thus, although the pro-
posed statute completely realigns the relationship between business and
government, the specific problem of distributor recovery against the
big-firm is ignored.
A less revolutionary but more practicable amendment could be
drafted to cover this problem. Assuming that the manufacturer's market
power places distributors in a disadvantageous position, a statutory
limitation on the exercise of that power can fairly be stated. A require-
ment that refusals to deal with former distributors must be "justified"
by valid business reasons would prevent the big-firm from unreasonably
dropping a distributor whose economic survival is dependent on his
dealings with that firm. Although this proposal is substantially more
narrow and less dramatic than that of Kaysen and Turner, both suffer
from the same defect. The present political scene makes any amendment
of the antitrust laws unlikely. Furthermore, it is little comfort to the
distributor who has lost his livelihood that future legislation will
protect others from a similar disaster.
CONCLUSION
A variety of section 1 theories are available to a distributor whose
trade is restrained by the unreasonable refusal to deal by a big-firm.
Recent developments indicate that a broader application of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy theory may be forthcoming. But inherent and
65 Id. at 98.
66 Id. at 270-71.
67 Id. at 271-72.
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judicially imposed limitations on that theory may seriously hinder
dealer recovery. The most reasonable antidote may be the development
of a new theory-the organizational conspiracy-recognizing the big-
firm as a unique development requiring special treatment. Its accept-
ance will ultimately turn on the extent to which the courts are willing
to develop further the "remarkable compound of law, economic
philosophy, cultural commitment and social religion"6 that is anti-
trust law.
Brian F. Toohey
68 Fortas, Foreword to A. NarFA, TnE ANmmiusT LAws o THE U.S.A. at v (1960).
